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MARBURY V. MADISON:
A CASE STUDY IN JUDICIAL REVIEW
SHAWN GUNNARSON

Judicial review currently stands
at the heart of a heated controversy.
That controversy involves several
issues, including the proper role of
a
Supreme
Court
justice,
the
separation
of
powers,
and
constitutional
interpretation.
Difficult as it is to separate these
issues
from
each
other--they
naturally overlap--I will focus on
the institution of judicial review in
this paper.
My thesis is that
understanding judicial review as the
Founders did may provide a key to
solving
the
current
controversy
surrounding that institution.
To
understand judicial review as the
Founders did, as well as contemporary
cr i ticisms of that understanding, I
will review a variety of sources both
pr imary and
secondary.
Because
Justice Marshall's opinion in Marbury
v.
Madison
established
judicial
review as a political institution,
that is where I begin.

Marbury v. Madisonl
Marshall begins his opinion by
posing the following questions:
(1)
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Does Marbury have a right to the
commission he demands?
(2) "If he
has a right, and that right has been
violated, do the laws of his country
afford him a remedy?"
(3)" I f they
do afford him a remedy, is it a
mandamus issuing from this court?"!
Each question deserves individual
attention to fill out Marshall's
reasoning.
Because
Marshall
establishes judicial review in answer
to the final question, it will be
examined most carefully.
Marshall argues that if Marbury
has a right to the commission he
demands,
then he must have been
legally appointed before President
Jefferson entered office.
Marshall
first ascertains that President Adams
duly appointed Marbury and that the
Senate approved Marbury's nomination.
From there the issue becomes more
intricate.
For once the President
has nominated and the Senate has
approved
a
judicial
nominee,
a
commission must be signed by the
President and sealed by the Secretary
of State with the great seal of the
Uni ted States.
Marshall concludes
that since the commission was signed
by the President and sealed by the
Secretary
of
Sta te,
Marbury' s
appointment
was
legally
binding.
Madison's counsel argues that the
commission must be delivered to be
legally binding, comparing a mandamus
to a deed.
Marshall refuses to
76
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accept
this
analogy
because
the
appointment would remain legal if the
commission were lost or stolen.
In
such a case a copy of the commission
would be readily made.
The salient
question,
then,
according
to
Marshall, is whether the appointment
is legally binding once the great
seal
has
been
affixed
to
the
commission.
Marshall asserts that
this is the case and concludes that
Marbury
has
the
right
to
the
commission he demands.
Marshall then asks whether the
laws of the United States afford
Marbury a remedy from the right that
has been violated.
He affirms this
and says that Madison's refusal to
deliver Marbury's commission violates
Marbury's legal right. And as in any
case where a legal right is violated,
Madison's
refusal
to
deliver
Marbury's
commission
violates
Marbury's right, "for which the laws
of his country afford [Marbury] a
remedy. 113
•
Marshall finally addresses the
question of whether or not a writ of
mandamus is the appropriate remedy in
Marbury's case.
He says that the
answer to this question depends on
three elements:
(4) "the nature of
the writ applied for,"
(5) "the
power of -this court" (6) "the nature
of the writ."1 The first question is
easily answered. A writ of mandamus
commands
II the
per formance
of
a
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particular act therein specified, and
belonging to his or their public,
official, or ministerial duty, or
di~ecting
the restoration of the
complainant to rights or privileges
of which he has
been illegally
depr i ved. 115
Based on the facts of
the case, Marshall reasons that the
nature of a mandamus makes it an
appropriate remedy for Marbury.
In review, Marbury has a right to
the commission he demands, Madison's
violation of
his
right
to that
commission may be remedied by law,
and a
writ of mandamus
is
the
appropriate remedy.
Every point has
been conceded to Marbury except one:
the power of the Supreme Court to
grant a writ of mandamus in his case.
Marshall
agrees
that
the
Judiciary Act of 1789 grants the
Supreme Court IIpower to issue .
writs of mandamus, in cases warranted
by the principle and usages of law,
to any.
. persons holding off ice
under the authority of the United
States. llo
However, MarShall argues
that
this
statutory
power
is
repugnant to the Constitution.
He
reaches this conclusion by inquiring
whether a writ of mandamus is a power
issuing from original or appellate
jurisdiction. (Marshall assumes that
the
statute
confers
original
jur isdiction--that assumption reads
lIoriginal ll into the statute.)
The principle of jurisdiction is
78
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important here because it is the
"Power and author i ty of a court to
hear
and
determine
a
judicial
proceeding'" or, as Marshall puts it,
"to say what the law is."~
And the
Constitution clearly spells out the
Supreme
Court's
original
jurisdiction,
while
leaving
the
Court's appellate jurisdiction to be
determined by congressional statute.~
On this distinction Marshall rests
his argument against the power of the
Supreme Court to issue a writ of
mandamus to Madison.
For if a
mandamus
is directly
related
to
original jurisdiction, and if the
Court lacks original jurisdiction in
Marbury's case, then the Court lacks
the power to issue a writ of mandamus
to Madison. But to say this implies
the power of judicial review.
Marshall's reasoning is crucial
here.
Marshall
says
that
the
language in the Judiciary Act of
1789, which authorizes the Supreme
Court to issue writs of mandamus,
contradicts the Constitution.
He
rests
this
conclusion
on
three
grounds: ( l) the Supremacy Clause;
(2) the nature of a written, limited
constitution; and (3) the nature of
judicial power.
The
Supremacy Clause of
the
Constitution
reads,
"This
Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties
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made, or which shall be made, under
the Authority of the united States,
shall-be the supreme Law of the
Land. " I l l
This
clearly
gives
precedence to the Constitution and to
laws "made in Pursuance thereof."
But when an act of Congress directly
contradicts the Constitution, which
of them should prevail?
Marshall
answers
this
by
referring to the nature of a written,
limited Constitution. He notes that
"The
powers
of
the
legislature
[Congress] are defined, and limited;
and that those limits may not be
mistaken,
or
forgotten,
the
constitution is written."11
Because
the Constitution is one of enumerated
powers,
Marshall
reasons
that
congressional power is limited. And
one of those limits is on Congress's
power to al ter the Supreme Cour t ' s
or ig inal jur isdict ion.
For though
the Constitution gives Congress the
power
to
determine
the
Supreme
Court's appellate jurisdiction, it
does not grant Congress the power to
determine
the
Court's
original
jurisdiction.
Therefore Congress
cannot alter what the Constitution
specifically enumerates and leaves
outside the congressional sphere.
Marshall
answers
the
final
question- by referring to the nature
of judicial power. As I have already
noted, he affirms the right of the
Court "to say what the law is."I> He
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further argues that the jurisdiction
of the Court to decide the case
implies the power to decide which of
two
conflicting
laws
ought
to
prevail.
Moreover,
because
the
Constitution is the fundamental law,
it
"controls any legislative act
repugnant to it."I:;
On
these
grounds,
Marshall
decides that Marbury may not receive
his
remedy.
Marbury
certainly
deserves the commission he demands.
The laws clearly offer him a remedy
for the right Madison violates by
refusing
to
deliver
Marbury's
commission.
And a mandamus is the
appropriate remedy in his case. But
because the Constitution has clearly
enumerated the scope of the Supreme
Court's
original
jurisdiction,
because a mandamus belongs within
that scope, and because the Court's
original jurisdiction does not extend
to a case such as Marbury's, the
Court lacks the power to issue a writ
of mandamus in Marbury's case.

Criticism of Marbury
Marshall's reasoning in Marbury
has come under considerable attack.
Christopher Wolfe has made the useful
distinction
between
criticism
grounded in the case itself and
criticism
grounded
in Marshall's
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constitutional
interpretation. II
Under
the
first
heading
is
the
objection raised. by Jefferson, who
contended that Marshall spoke at
great length on the mer i ts of the
case before saying that the Court
lacked jurisdiction. 15
Under the
second
is
the
broader
objection
raised by those who disagree wi th
Marshall's
defense
of
judicial
review.
Jefferson's objection rests on a
sound
legal
foundation.
Legal
opinions are economical.
If a court
lacks jurisdiction or the case lacks
justiciabili ty, the opinion generally
says so directly without referring to
the merits of the case.
To do
otherwise may violate the spirit of
judicial power, which is limited to
deciding specific cases. For if the
case cannot be heard on its mer i ts
for whatever reason, the court has
the duty to say that and nothing
else. Such is the convention.
The
circumstances
surrounding
Marbury suggest why Marshall departed
from such a convention.
The nation
was eleven years old.
The first
major transfer of power from one
party to another had just occurred.
Ai though the Federalists had every
constitutional
right
to
appoint
"midnight judges," the Jeffersonians
resented the appointments and sought
to counter them.
One of those
methods
was
unconstitutional:
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refusing to deliver the remaining
judicial commissions. There was even
some talk among the Jeffersonians
that Federalist judges,
including
Supreme Court justices, ought to be
impeached. It was in this atmosphere
of novelty and acrimony that Marshall
fashioned the Marbury opinion. Given
these ci rcumstances, it is easy to
see why Marshall did not limi this
opinion
to
the
question
of
jurisdiction.
He
wanted
the
Jeffersonians
to
know
that
the
judiciary would not be controlled by
its poli tical opponents. 16
The
grounds
for
criticizing
Marshall's defense of judicial review
are
broader
and
more
complex.
Perhaps the most wounding indictment
of judicial review was leveled by
Alexander
Bickel,
who
noted
the
"counter-majoritarian difficulty" of
defending
judicial
review
in
a
democratic society. 17
Bickel argues
that a democratic society rests on
the
principles
of
consent
and
representation.
The legislature,
because it is elected to represent
certain segments of "the people,"
epitomizes these principles. Bickel
extends this reasoning and finds that
judicial
review
violates
these
pr inciples.
Though he admi ts that
Hamilto~ defends judicial review in
Federalist 78 along the same lines
tha t Marshall does in Marbury, he,
nevertheless, asserts that a panel of
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justices cannot invalidate a statute
without
thereby
subverting
the
principles
of
consent
and
representation. Federal justices are
not elected; they are appointed to
terms
of
Ifgood
behavior, If
which
amounts to lifetime tenure.
This
insulates them from the kind of
political pressure that ostensibly
keeps other political offices, such
as the Presidency and the Congress,
close to the people.
The Ifcountermajoritarian difficultylf occurs when
the legislature passes a measure that
the Court rules unconstitutional. If
the legislature, which is elected and
representative, determines a policy
that it judges to be in the public
interest,
what
right
has
the
judiciary, which is appointed and
nonrepresentative, to invalidate that
policy?
The most notable answer to
this
question
is
provided
in
Federalist 78 by Alexander Hamilton.l~

Federalist 78
Hamilton defends the principle of
an
independent
judiciary
in
Federalist 78.
Since the mode of
appointment is previously discussed,
he does_ not repeat those arguments
here.
Instead, he concentrates on
the reasoning behind an independent
judiciary.
Tenure
during
Ifgood
84
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behavior" is the first principle of
an
independent
judiciary.
Such
tenure is, as Hamilton says, "[an]
excellent
barrier
to
the
encroachments and oppressions of the
representative body."'9
He proceeds
to characterize the judiciary as the
"least
dangerous"
branch
of
government,
because it lacks the
legislative power of the purse or the
executive power of the sword.!O It is
in this context that Hamilton defends
judicial review. And it is here that
the connection between Hamilton's
reasoning
in
Federalist
78
and
Marshall's
reasoning
in
Marbury
becomes apparent.
Like Marshall, Hamilton grounds
his defense of judicial review on the
connections between the necessity of
an independent judiciary~ the nature
of a written, limited constitution;
and the nature of judicial power .~I
Hamilton's argument is similar enough
to
Marshall's
to
largely
avoid
repeating it.!"! But Hamilton differs
from
Marshall
on
two
important
points.
Hamilton
emphasizes an
aspect
of
judicial
power
that
Marshall does not when he observes
that "the courts were designed to be
an intermediate body between the
people and the legislature, in order,
among 0ther things,
to keep the
latter within the limits assigned to
their authority."~
And he notes an
important qualification on judicial
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power
that
Marshall
does
not
emphasize: "Liberty can have nothing
to fear from the judiciary alone, but
would have everything to fear from
its union wi th either of the other
departments."u So Hamilton provides
three pr imary reasons why judicial
review is defensible in a popular
regime. (1) An independent judiciary
provides an important check on the
excesses of the legislature. (2) The
judiciary poses less danger than the
other branches of government, so long
as it remains separate from them.
(3) The judiciary has the duty of
deciding what the law is.
Because
the Constitution is the fundamental
law, this duty implies the power of
settling
conflicts
between
the
Constitution and a statute (which
power is another name for judicial
review) .

Reply to Bickel
In light of Hamilton's reasoning,
we can answer Bickel's "countermajoritarian
difficulty."
The
legislature is the majoritarian power
in our republ ic.
As such, it has
great power. Given unlimited power,
it could prove as tyrannical as the
eighteenth-century
British
parliament.
The
Constitution
specifically limits that power by
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proscribing ex-post-facto laws, bills
of attainder, and the like.
It also
limits ~egislative power by placing
the judiciary between it and the
people.
Thus judicial review is
counter-majoritarian
only
in
the
sense that it does not allow the
legislature unlimited power to pass
laws that may alter the Constitution.
Some suggest that such judicial power
is dangerous.
Hamilton's answer to
this objection is clear: keep the
judiciary from uniting with the other
branches of government.
In other
words, so long as the judiciary does
not exercise legislative or executive
powers, it will remain "the least
dangerous branch."

Additional Criticism and
Plausible Answers
Bickel's objection to judicial
review is perhaps the strongest, but
others have posed objections that
also deserve some at tent ion.
They
may be grouped under the following
categories. (1) Lacking precedent or
textual
justification,
Marshall
invented judicial review in Marbury.
(2) The Founders disagreed over the
nature Of judicial review enough that
we may hesitate when characterizing
Marshall and Hamilton's reasoning as
authoritative.
Precedent
must
87
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always be seen in light of historical
context.
The United States was
fourteen years old when Marshall
wrote Marbury. Thus there was little
precedent for Marshall to rely on,
especially when we remember that the
Founders emphasized the novel nature
of the American Constitution.~5 Wolfe
notes, however, that the Court had
already entertained the question of
constitutionality in Hylton v. United
States
nearly
a
decade
before
Marbury. ~6 Though Hyl ton was decided
without
raising
the question of
constitutionality,
there was some
precedent
for
entertaining
the
question itself when the Court was
confronted with Marbury. Given this
perspective,
the
objection
that
Marshall did not pay deference to
stare decisis is unpersuasive.
Textual justification is harder
to
come
by.
Nowhere
in
the
Constitution does it read, "Any act
by another branch of government,
which
is
repugnant
to
the
Constitution, shall be invalidated by
the judiciary."
However,
Marshall
was
not
altogether without textual evidence
for
judicial
review.
The
Constitution
provides
that
"The
judicial Power shall extend to all
Cases, -in Law and Equi ty, ar ising
under this Constitution, the Laws of
the United States, and Treaties made,
or which shall be made, under their
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Authority."<!?
This
provision
certainly allowed Marshall to take
~cognizance of Marbury.
But it is the
combination of this provision, the
Supremacy Clause, and the "case or
controversy" requirement of article
III that provides Marshall with the
textual basis for his defense of
judicial review in Marbury.
Each
provision depends
on
the other.
Together they define judicial power
so as to include judicial review.
Article III, section 1 grants "the
judicial Power of the United States"
to
supreme and
inferior
courts.
Section 2 of the same article says
that those courts have jurisdiction
over certain cases and controversies.
The Supremacy Clause (article VI,
section 2) defines the relationship
between
state and
federal
laws.
Judicial
review
includes
such a
relationship by textual enumeration.
That
it
also
encompasses
the
relationship between congressional
statutes and the Constitution is
evident from the Court's power to
hear
cases
"ar ising
under
this
Constitution.""
As Marshall points
ou t,
it
would
be
absurd
to
acknowledge
this
power
without
acknowledging
the
Court's
corresponding power to invalidate a
1a w
-w h i c h
con t r ad i c t s
the
Constitution.!~
And this, of course,
is another way of expressing judicial
review.
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An answer to the second objection
must understandably be brief.
Some
argue that the Founders disagreed
over judicial review enough to make
one hesi tate in accepting Marshall
and
Hamilton's
position
as
authoritative. This argument ignores
the important relationship, which the
Founders
acknowledged,
between
judicial review and the separation of
powers.
Hamilton's
defense
of
judicial review in Federalist 78 has
already been shown in context: a
defense of an independent judiciary.
Madison may be considered an advocate
for the party opposite Hamilton. But
on this question the two agree.
As
Madison says, "The accumulation of
all powers, legislative, executive,
and judiciary, in the same hands . .
. may justly be pronounced the very
definition of tyranny."JU
And he
points to the same source for this
threat as Hamilton does: unlimited
legislative power .11
In response to
those
who
suggest
that
judicial
review belongs with Congress, John
Adams suggests that Congress would be
ill-suited to judicial power because
it is "too numerous, too slow, and
too little skilled in the laws. "l:!
The Founders evidently agreed on the
necessity
for
the
separation of
powers, the pr imary threat of the
legislature to that separation, and
the impropriety of granting judicial
review to the legislature.
Some
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disagreement between the Founders
over political policies may be freely
admitted,-but they apparently agreed
with Marshall and Hamilton over what
judicial review should be. They also
agreed
that
judicial
power
is
designed to check legislative power,
a fact seemingly ignored by Bickel
and others.

Conclusion
The controversy over
judicial
review is complex but not insolvable.
Understanding judicial review as the
Founders--a
means
of
checking
legislative power and upholding the
Constitution as the fundamental law-leads us to conclude that judicial
review works best when it pursues
those ends for which it was created.
An
important
qualification
on
judicial review is that judges cannot
exercise legislative or executive
power without thereby -endangering
liberty.33
Such a conception of judicial
review
is
neither
simple
nor
dismissible.
No simple rule will
ever govern the interpretation of
law, especially if that law purports
to
be
fundamental
like
the
Constitution.
It is difficult to
interpret current statutes in light
of a text wr i t ten over two-hundred
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years ago. Yet we cannot escape this
difficulty by dismissing judicial
review.
Its history predates the
Constitution, and sound reasoning
supports its preservation. However,
it does present us wi th a dilemma
that
was
best
expressed
by
Tocqueville, who wrote "Judges seem
to intervene in public affairs only
by chance, but that chance recurs
dai ly. ",,~
Though
judges
cannot
initiate public policy as the other
branches
of
government
do,
they
nevertheless "intervene in public
affairs" almost daily.
The dilemma
is to so intervene without crossing
the
line
between
judicial
and
legislative power.
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NOTES
1.The facts of Marbury illuminate
Marshall's reasoning.
I therefore
include a brief recitation of those
facts here, for which I am indebted
to the following: Craig R. Ducat and
Harold
W.
Chase,
Constitutional
Interpretation, 4th ed., (St. Paul,
Minn.: West, 1988), 16-17.
In the election of 1800 the
Jeffersonians won control of the
Presidency
and
both
houses
of
Congress.
To keep what poli tical
power they could, the Federalists
under President John Adams appointed
a ser ies of federal judges.
When
Thomas
Jefferson
entered
the
Presidency four judicial commissions
remained undel i vered.
One of these
undelivered commissions belonged to
William
Marbury,
who
had
been
appointed justice of the peace for
the District of Columbia. Under the
direction of President Jefferson,
Secretary of State James Madisoh
refused to deliver the remaining
commissions.
Consequently, Marbury
sued Madison
before
the
Supreme
Court. Pursuant to section 13 of the
Judiciary
Act
of
1789,
Marbury
requested that the Court issue a writ
of mandamus directing Madison to
deliver the commission.
Because
Congress suspended the Court's 1802
session, the Cour t did not decide
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Marbury's case until 1803.
The
opinion of the Court was written by
Chief Justice Marshall.

2.Marbury v. Madison,
Cranch) 155 (1803).

5

U.S.

(1

3.ld., 168
4.lbid.
5.Black's Law Dictionary, 5th ed., s.v.
"Mandamus. "
6.Judiciary Act, sec. 13 (1789).
7.Black's Law Dictionary, 5th ed., s.v.
"jurisdiction. "
8.Marbury v. Madison,
Cranch) 177 (1803).

5

U.S.

(1

U.S.

(1

9.Constitution, art. III, sec. 2.
10.Constitution, art. VI, sec. 2.
11.Marbury v. Madison,
Cranch) 176 (1803).
12.ld., 177.
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13.lbid.
14.Christopher Wolfe, The Rise of
Modern
Judicial
Review:
From
Constitutional Interpretation to JudgeMade Law (New York, N.Y.: Basic
Books, 1986), 84.
15.lbid., 87.
16.ld.
17.Alexander M. Bickel, The Least
Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court
at the Bar of Politics. 2d ed. (New
Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press,
1986), 16-23.
18.lt is helpful to remember the
conditions under which The Federalist
was written. It is a series of articles
written to persuade the people of New
York to ratify the Constitution. But, as
Martin Diamond suggests, "It seems
clear that its authors also looked
beyond the immediate struggle and
wrote with a view to influencing later
generations by making their work the
authoritative
commentary
on
the
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meaning of the Constitution." (Martin
Diamond, "The Federalist," in History of
Political Philosophy, ed. Leo Strauss
and Joseph Cropsey, 3d ed., [Chicago,
III: University of Chicago Press, 1987],
659, emphasis added).
19.Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and
James Madison, Jr., The Federalist, ed.
Michael Loyd Chadwick (Springfield,
Va.: Global Affairs, 1987), 421. I will
hereafter refer to the number and
paragraph of the Federalist, instead of
edition and page number.
For
instance, this reference would be cited
simply as Federalist 78.6.
20.Federalist 78.7-8.
21.Hamilton's argument on the first two
points is so cogent and concise that I
take the liberty of reproducing it here.
"The complete independence of the
courts of justice is peculiarly essential
in a limited Constitution. By a limited
Constitl,ltion, I understand one which
contains certain specified exceptions to
the legislative authority; such, for
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instance, as that it shall pass no bills
of attainder, no ex-post-facto laws, and
the like. Limitations of this kind can
be preserved in practice no other way
than through the medium of courts of
justice, whose duty it must be to
declare all acts contrary to the manifest
tenor of the Constitution void. Without
this, all the reservations of particular
rights or privileges would amount to
nothing" (Federalist 78.9).
22.To compare the two arguments, see
especially Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch) 176-80; and Federalist 78.922.
23.Federalist 78.12, emphasis added.
24.Federalist 78.8, emphasis added.
25.Federalist 1.2.
26.Christopher Wolfe, The Rise of
Modern
Judicial
Review:
From
Constitutional
Interpretation
to
Judge-Made Law (New York, N.Y.: Basic
Books, 1986), 80.

27.Constitution, art. III, sec. 2.
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28.Constitution, art. III, sec. 2 .
.29.Marbury v .. ·. Madison,
Cranch) 178 (1803).

5

U.S.

(1

30.Federalist 47.3.
31.See Federalist 48.3.
32.John Adams to George Wythe,
liThe
Constitution
January
1776,
Papers,
Electronic Text Corporation,
Drem, Utah.
II

33.Federalist 78.8.
34.A1exis de Tocquevi11e, Democracy
in America, trans. George Lawrence,
ed. J.P. Mayer (Garden City, N.Y.:
Harper & Row, 1969), 99.
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